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depends on the gender of the partner with higher preferences. 
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In recent decades, many governments undertook major reforms to child-contingent ben-
eﬁts with the aim of stimulating fertility and battling child poverty. But do child beneﬁt
payments really aﬀect fertility? Suppose couples have heterogeneous preferences about
how many children to have and how much money to spend on them. In a unitary model of
household behavior (Samuelson, 1956; Becker, 1960), child beneﬁts and allowances would
raise the demand for children through both a positive income eﬀect and a positive own
price eﬀect. Moreover, there is nothing to be gained by choosing a particular recipient
of the beneﬁt. If, by contrast, the allocation of resources within the family is resolved
through a process of bargaining (Manser and Brown, 1980; McElroy and Horney, 1981;
Chiappori, 1992), then who receives the beneﬁt matters because the recipient’s bargain-
ing power gets stronger. To see this, suppose that the allocation of bargaining power
within the family depends on relative incomes, and that the female partner has a higher
preference for children than the male partner. Then the eﬀect of child beneﬁts on fertility
outcomes is larger if they are paid to the female partner directly.
This paper’s principal contribution is to circumvent the assignability problem of em-
pirical evaluations of bargaining models by relying on preference data and ultimately
to test whether couples bargain over the public good fertility. The existing literature
of family bargaining tests concentrates on private goods and relies on an assignability
assumption for identiﬁcation due to data limitations. Consumption is usually observed
at the household level which makes it cumbersome to test whose consumption reacts to
changes in bargaining power, so the researcher is forced to ﬁnd goods that are assignable
to one spouse only, i.e., they are useless to the other. An eﬀect of bargaining power on
assignable private consumption with total income held constant can be interpreted as
evidence for a bargaining process. A classical example of bargaining tests is sex-speciﬁc
clothing that is only valued by a single person (Browning, 1994; Lundberg et al., 1997).
Assigning a good to an individual makes theoretical sense as long as the partner does not
care more about her (respectively, his) partner’s apparel than he (respectively, she) about
his own clothing. But if goods are not fully private and preferences are unknown, the
tests could yield false results. Ermisch and Pronzato (2008) convincingly circumvent the
problem of assignability by looking at child support payments of separated, non-custodial
fathers with new relationships. Using BHPS data they ﬁnd that relative income within
2the new household has an eﬀect on spending on the child. To make inference they just
need to ensure that the new partner puts no high weight on the father’s child’s welfare.
We circumvent the assignability problem by relying on self-reported preference data
for a public good from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) and exploit the the-
oretical prediction that only in the case of a preference conﬂict there can be a bargaining
power eﬀect. This approach has three advantages: i)we are able to test bargaining for a
public good and thus, in our paper, fertility, ii) the use of fertility makes sure that our
outcome variable is of as much importance to family decisions as a whole that bargaining
would be relevant and iii) we can exclude the possibility of a confounding preference shift
in the same direction as the bargaining power eﬀect or a correlation of the two. For our
empirical analysis we construct a treatment group of couples with heterogeneous and a
control group of couples with homogeneous self-reported child preferences in a repeated
cross-section. The commonly used relative income within a partnership acts as an indica-
tor of bargaining power. We compare whether relative income aﬀects fertility diﬀerently
between the homogeneous and the heterogenous preference groups.
The central ﬁnding from our econometric analysis is that couples appear to bargain
over fertility. We ﬁnd clear indication of diﬀerential eﬀects of bargaining power on fertility
between couples with homogeneous and heterogeneous preferences. For couples in which
the woman has higher child preferences than her partner, fertility increases with her
bargaining power, as captured by her relative income. The eﬀect stems mainly from ﬁrst
births. This in turn means that the small positive eﬀect of child beneﬁts on fertility
can be enhanced by directing beneﬁts to women. It would not only reach the group
with higher child preferences, but also improve the bargaining position of members of
the target group. In an extension to our analysis, we also ﬁnd evidence that mothers
with higher child preferences than their partners can better commit to ex ante resource
allocations than mothers with lower child preferences, who are more prone to renegotiate
the terms of bargaining after a ﬁrst birth. This implies that mothers who cut working
hours due to child caring and the like may lose bargaining power and say in household
decisions. However, the results are heterogeneous, i.e., this is only true if women have
lower child preferences than their partners.
Our approach carries some potential caveats. We cannot be sure that the two groups
do not diﬀer besides their reported preferences and what we can control for with socio-
economic variables. If there is endogenous selection in the relationship matching process
3that produces the prediction of a bargaining model, our results could be confounded.
Moreover, relative income is not exogenous and heterogeneous partnerships could be
more unstable. We try to dispel doubts when discussing the empirical strategy.
This paper is related to several strands of the family economics literature. Clearly it
aligns with econometric work seeking to identify whether family members bargain over
resource allocations, which ﬁnds evidence for that from assignable goods (Browning,
1994; Lundberg et al., 1997; Ermisch and Pronzato, 2008). A related strand of empirical
literature deals with gender-speciﬁc child outcomes that ﬁnd family bargaining as one ex-
planation (Thomas, 1994), also when using natural experiments of positive income shocks
to females due to pension reform in South Africa (Duﬂo, 2003) and tea prices in China
(Qian, 2008). None of these papers uses preference data, while all assume gender-speciﬁc
preferences to explain the results with bargaining. By showing that relative income also
matters for fertility decisions and that it is consistent with child preference data, the
present paper provides further evidence that household decision-making depends on how
intra-family bargains play out.
This paper is also connected to empirical literature on the impact of family policies on
fertility. The estimated eﬀect on fertility, which is analyzed in numerous articles using
macro-level data, can be summed up to be positive but small (Gauthier, 2007). This
is especially true for cash child beneﬁts as found for 22 OECD countries (Gauthier and
Hatzius, 1997). Studies based on micro-level data ﬁnd diﬀerential eﬀects for ﬁrst, second
or third children as well as eﬀects on the timing of births (Cigno and Ermisch, 1989;
Genosko and Weber, 1992; Althammer, 2000; Cigno et al., 2003; Laroque and Salanié,
2004). Findings from this paper contribute to that literature by providing an explanation
for the heterogeneous eﬀects of child beneﬁts usually found.
Furthermore, this paper connects to the small strand of literature on child preferences
and fertility. Preference data has been incorporated in bargaining models of fertility to
test commitment versus non-commitment models for Malaysian couples (Rasul, 2008).
In contrast, this paper discusses the role of preferences for bargaining and unitary models
as well as for the eﬀect of public policy. Similarly, the test of commitment to household
resource allocations is related to the endogenous bargaining power literature, which cap-
tures dynamics in household decision-making (Ligon, 2002; Lundberg and Pollak, 2003;
Basu, 2006; Iyigun and Walsh, 2007).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we discuss some
4theoretical background to family decision-making and generate testable predictions. In
section 3 we describe the data. We lay out the estimation strategy in section 4 and
present the results in section 5. In section 6 we oﬀer concluding remarks.
2 Theoretical Considerations
The ﬁrst key feature of the bargaining approach to household decision-making is that
it does not rely on the income pooling hypothesis. Indeed, individual incomes are not
converted into a single household budget constraint as in the unitary approach, but
either form the basis of an individual budget constraint or determine how pooled house-
hold income is allocated among family members. One way of testing whether couples
bargain over the allocation of household resources is to look at whether changes in the
relative incomes of family members alter fertility decisions while holding the sum of in-
comes constant. The second key feature concerns how the allocation of bargaining power
shapes intra-family resource allocation. Employing a cooperative bargaining framework,
McElroy and Horney (1981) assume that the allocation of intra-family bargaining power
depends on divorce threat points. Lundberg and Pollak (1993), in contrast, suggest a
non-cooperative household equilibrium as an internal threat point in household bargain-
ing. As child beneﬁts are paid to the custodian in the event of divorce, changing the
recipient within marriage should theoretically not alter family resource allocations in the
divorce-threat bargaining model. The case of a non-cooperative household equilibrium
as the fall-back position is thus more relevant to our analysis. In this section, we brieﬂy
discuss demand for children in the simple unitary model and a multi-preference family
model.
In the unitary model (Samuelson, 1956; Becker, 1960), household demand functions are
derived through maximization of a household utility function U subject to the household
budget constraint. Suppose the household is comprised of two people, say a wife w and a
husband h. Household expenditure is allocated between a good qw, privately consumed
by w, a good qh, privately consumed by h, and a household public good Q. Children
are assumed to be the public good, because of their non-rivalry in consumption. The
maximization problem thus becomes maxqw;qh;QU(qw;qh;Q), s.t. p0(qw + qh + Q) = IT,
with p0 being the vector of goods prices and IT = Iw + Ih as total household income.
Demand for the three types of goods is D(qw;qh;Q) = f(p0;IT). Demand depends on
5goods prices and total income, but is independent of individual incomes Iw and Ih or
relative income Iw=(Ih + Iw) when controlling for total income. This leads to our ﬁrst
testable prediction:
Prediction 1. In the unitary model, relative income has no inﬂuence on the demand for
children if total income is held constant.
Empirically, there is robust evidence that relative income matters for assignable goods
(Browning, 1994; Lundberg et al., 1997). However, results based on the assignability of
goods are dependent on the functional form of individual utility functions, i.e., whether
selﬁsh, caring or altruistic preferences are assumed. Leisure can clearly not be consumed
by another person, but with altruistic preferences the partner may be concerned about
the other’s work-life-balance. Even a selﬁsh person may regard her partner’s leisure as
complementary. The clothing example comes also into play again, where one cannot
be sure that a partner does not care about the other’s looks. Without knowing the
underlying preferences, it might even be possible that the one cares more about the
partner’s looks than about her own. If one has very low preferences for clothes in contrast
to her partner and both are altruistic, results of income pooling tests would be ﬂawed.
We circumvent this assignability problem by directly using child preference data and
by interpreting the demand for children as the public good.1 With diﬀerent preferences
between partners, relative incomes can aﬀect fertility behavior, but only if couples are
engaged in a process of bargaining. Heterogeneous preferences are not accounted for in
the unitary model and, thus, cannot aﬀect the decision.
The alternative to the unitary approach is the collective model or the related bargain-
ing approach. In these frameworks, relative income becomes a key factor determining
intra-household decisions. Separate utility functions Uw and Uh, which are deﬁned by
their arguments for private good consumption and the public good at Uw(qw;Q) and
Uh(qh;Q), are used to derive household demand functions. In a collective model à la
Chiappori (1988, 1992) the household maximizes Uw(qw;Q) + (1   )Uh(qh;Q) with
respect to the joint budget p0(qw + qh + Q) = Iw + Ih instead of maximizing household
utility.2 The parameter  indicates the balance of power in the household. Thus, if 
1When focusing on a public good, the functional form becomes less important. Both partners care
for the public good according to their preferences, and the results are less sensitive to altruism and
caring preferences.
2It is recognized that Nash bargaining models as developed by Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy
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depend on other parameters such as individual income. With relative incomes inﬂuenc-
ing the weighting of utilities to be maximized, this bargaining power determines what
fractions are spent on assignable goods and on children with respect to individual pref-
erences. The key diﬀerence to the unitary model becomes apparent here. Suppose the
woman has higher preferences for children than her partner. An increase in her income
relative to total household income shifts the household’s expenditure towards children
and raises fertility. No such bargaining power eﬀect appears in the unitary framework.
This implies:
Prediction 2. Suppose couples bargain over fertility and have heterogeneous child pref-
erences. Then bargaining power—as captured by relative income—aﬀects the demand for
children.
3 The Data
Our data source is the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), which includes informa-
tion of the socio-economic background of individuals, households and their intra-family
relations. Partners can be matched easily by their identiﬁers so that we get a sample
of couples with each partner’s individual socio-economic characteristics. In our analysis,
we exclude GSOEP sample G, which comprises high-income households only and we are
constrained to the waves from 1990 to 2004, in which child preferences are reported.
The dependent variable in our empirical analysis of the family bargaining process is the
probability of birth in period t+1. We use this time lead against the control variables to
capture the relevant socio-economic condition, when a decision over fertility is arguably
made. As we can only observe the completed births of one year in the following panel
wave, and we additionally assume the time lead and use births in t + 1, the two latest
waves are lost in the estimation. Descriptive statistics for the estimation sample are
depicted in Table 1. The low mean in the binary variable Birth(t + 1) of 0.06 can be
interpreted as 60 births per 1000 fertile women each year or a hypothetical fertility rate
of 1.2, which is close to actual nationwide measures.
and Horney (1981) are special cases of the collective approach to the household. We abstain from
discussing them explicitly, as results are qualitatively comparable.
7Table 1: Descriptive statistics from women’s perspective
Women’s Child Preferences
Whole sample Equal Higher Lower
Birth (t+1) 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.05
Preference 1.48 1.39 1.23 2.48
Partner’s pref. 1.61 1.39 2.37 1.38
Pref. interpolated 1.44 1.34 1.25 2.22
Partner’s pref. interpol. 1.57 1.34 2.08 1.42
Conﬂict (higher) 0.34 0.00 1.00
Conﬂict (lower) 0.20 0.00 1.00
Y
R 0.26 0.25 0.28 0.31
Child beneﬁts 1224.4 1211.74 1242.21 1237.51
Age 32.36 32.45 32.36 32.04
Catholic 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08
Native 0.92 0.91 0.93 0.93
Income 520.83 476.17 545.63 645.31
Partner’s income 1488.34 1496.48 1468.43 1497.31
Not enrolled 0.93 0.94 0.93 0.92
ISCED 3.60 3.60 3.58 3.60
GDP growth 1.91 1.95 1.84 1.91
Birth (t) 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.05
Worries 2.03 2.02 2.03 2.09
The ﬁrst key variable of interest is the child preference of women and their part-
ners. Child preferences in the GSOEP are obtained by asking the participants for the
importance of having children. Possible answers are: very important (1), important
(2), not very important (3) and unimportant (4).3 Descriptive statistics of the variable
Child preference are shown in Table 1. Women’s child preferences have a lower mean,
so women have higher preferences than their partners on average. As only four waves
contain this variable,4 we interpolate the data linearly in between to get a suﬃciently
large sample. This can imply measurement error if child preferences ﬂuctuate a lot. The
implicit assumption is that these preferences are relatively stable over time, so we can
still distinguish between couples with and without preference conﬂicts.5 Interpolation
does not change the overall descriptive statistics signiﬁcantly. As a robustness check we
3The precise question is: "Are the following things currently ... for you?" We use answers to the
category "Have children".
4The questionnaires of 1990, 1992, 1995, 2004, and 2008 contain the preference item. We cannot use
the latest 2008 wave, as it is the newest available data and we lose the two latest waves due to the
time lead in births and the ex-post construction of the completed fertility for one year.
5About two-thirds of reported preferences are stable between the surveys.
8test our model with the original data. The preference relation within couples determines
whether women belong to the treatment group used to identify whether couples bargain
over fertility. The variable Conﬂict (higher) takes on a value of unity if women have
higher child preferences than their partners, and zero if preferences are equal. Accord-
ingly, women have higher preferences in 34 percent of included observations. The group
of women with lower child preferences than men, Conﬂict (lower), is smaller, representing
only 20 percent of the included observations. We have 4453 person-year observations in
the treatment group of women with higher preferences than their partners in our data
and 2169 observations for women with lower preferences. The control group of couples
with homogeneous child preferences comprises 8515 person-year observations. Table 2
shows the fractions of answers to the child preference question separately for men and
women. We distinguish three categories, all couples, childless couples, and parents. 65
percent of the women think it is very important to have children, whereas this is true
for only 55 percent of the men. This diﬀerence trickles down to lower preferences, while
the lowest category unimportant is rare. The same gender pattern is noticed for childless
couples and parents, who report high preferences more often. On average women value
having children more than men do.
Table 2: Fractions of answers to importance of having children
Whole sample Childless couples Parents
Females
Very important 0.6481 0.2680 0.7657
Important 0.2467 0.3587 0.2120
Not very important 0.0807 0.2807 0.0188
Unimportant 0.0246 0.0927 0.0035
Males
Very important 0.5496 0.1920 0.6603
Important 0.3225 0.3853 0.3030
Not very important 0.1012 0.3240 0.0322
Unimportant 0.0268 0.0987 0.0045
The second key variable of interest is relative income as a determinant of individual
bargaining power. The variable Y R is deﬁned as the fraction of individual earned gross





. Women contribute on average 26
percent to total income, thus their bargaining power is on average much lower than the
men’s bargaining power.
Descriptive statistics of additional control variables are shown in Table 1. We use Child
beneﬁts to control for family policies.6 The variable Age is bounded by the restriction on
20- to 39-year-olds. We constrain ourselves to women in the child-bearing age, in order
to circumvent increasing numbers of completed fertility histories. The variable Catholic
takes on a value of unity for catholics, and is zero otherwise. The variable Native is
zero for foreign born women and unity for natives, indicating that the sample comprises
92 percent natives. Real net earned income, based on consumer price indices from the
Federal Statistical Oﬃce, denoted by Income, averages at around 520 euro and shows a
signiﬁcantly lower median, which is explained by the mass of women in the data, who
do not work at all. The mean earned income of the male partner, Partner’s income,
is about threefold that of the women, while its median-average spread is smaller. The
variable Not enrolled equals one if the person does not participate in education or further
training and zero otherwise, so less than seven percent are in education. The variable
ISCED denotes the level of educational attainment in ISCED-1997-classiﬁcation. GDP
growth is the annual growth rate, reﬂecting the overall economic situation. Birth (t)
in the current period is inserted to control for the biological constraint that makes two
births in successive years unlikely. The variable Worries describes worries about the own
economic situation on a decreasing scale.7
4 Estimation Strategy
Our main aim is to provide evidence on whether or not couples bargain over fertility.
To that end, we estimate the eﬀect of relative income as a determinant of bargaining
power on birth probability by comparing the eﬀect between two groups indicated by
the interaction of relative income and a conﬂicting preference dummy. According to
bargaining theory, relative income should only matter for fertility in the presence of
child preference heterogeneity. Conversely, if partners have identical child preferences,
then birth probability should be unaﬀected by relative income. Our estimation approach
6The entitlement in case of having a child is computed combining the tax allowance and the ﬁxed
beneﬁt dependent on the couple’s income.
7Very concerned is denoted by 1, somewhat concerned by 2 and not concerned at all by 3.
10uses a control-group design to make inferences about the impact of relative income on
birth probabilities. The treatment group comprises persons with higher child preferences
than their partners, while the control group is made up of couples with homogeneous
child preferences. Our identiﬁcation of bargaining over fertility relies on the predicted
diﬀerence in the eﬀect of relative income between the two groups. If preferences are
homogeneous, bargaining power will have no eﬀect on fertility decisions. But for a
person with higher preferences than her partner a positive eﬀect of her relative income on
fertility should be found. Thus, the interaction between the preference conﬂict dummy
and relative income Conflict  Y R allows us to tease out the extent to which relative
income matters in the presence of child preference heterogeneity. A positive eﬀect would
then only be consistent with the bargaining approach.
Our identifying assumption is that the two groups do not diﬀer in a way that aﬀects
the relative income eﬀect on fertility except for the child preferences after controlling for
other socio-economic variables. This implies that there may not be a diﬀerential selec-
tion into the groups based on unobserved variables that also aﬀect fertility. However, a
diﬀerence in the group mean of fertility is allowed so that self-selection based on relative
income is not a concern. Results could be confounded if partners with heterogeneous
preferences were reacting diﬀerently to relative income not because they have a prefer-
ence conﬂict but because they are diﬀerent in an unobserved way. A possibility would
be that people seeking harmonic relations would self-select into partnerships with homo-
geneous child preferences and abstain from bargaining. This could cause problems for
identiﬁcation if need for harmony was correlated with relative income. Given that the
harmonic people would be self-selected into homogeneous partnerships, relative income
may not be diﬀerent between the groups in order to be able to identify the eﬀect, but
descriptive statistics show that this is not the case or that they are not quantitatively
important. If the correlation is non-existent we would just have an alternative expla-
nation to the bargaining story. A correlation between assertiveness and relative income
may also be present. Then we would capture more of the bargaining power than the part
that is explained by relative income. Furthermore, reverse causality is unlikely to appear
as the dependent variable is one year ahead of the independent variables. Although the
decision to have a child could alter the relative earnings of the couple in the relevant
period, the birth itself does not. Nevertheless, as relative income is not exogenous in
our data, partners with a preference conﬂict could try to increase their bargaining power
11by working more and bringing home a higher income share. The diﬀerence in the eﬀect
of relative income on birth probability between the control and treatment group would
still be informative. Moreover, both partners in these couples have incentives to increase
their bargaining power. Only if those in the heterogenous preference group that have
higher birth probabilities would increase their relative income more than others, the eﬀect
could be confounding. Yet, the mean statistics for relative income are not very diﬀerent
between the groups.
There is also a potential attrition problem for the conﬂict group if couples with dif-
ferent preferences were more likely to separate and the remaining couples had a higher
probability of child birth. Separated couples would drop out of the sample so that the
remaining may just be those, who have higher commitment levels and higher birth prob-
abilities. This is controlled for with the diﬀerent levels of birth probability between the
conﬂict and homogenous preference groups. A problem for identiﬁcation only arises if
the separation function of conﬂicting preferences was negatively correlated with female
relative income, i.e., if higher female earnings would imply a lower reaction in separa-
tion to conﬂicting preferences. Then the remaining couples would have higher female
relative incomes and higher birth probabilities due to unobserved heterogeneity. This
would confound a bargaining result. If higher earnings would lead to higher separation
probability in case of conﬂicting preferences, we would estimate a lower bound, because
the remaining couples would have lower female bargaining power but higher birth proba-
bilities due to unobserved characteristics, which contradicts our prediction and leads to a
downward bias. The latter case is more relevant theoretically as the gain from marriage
usually decreases with female earnings or the female outside option increases and, thus,
separations become more likely if women earn a larger share. Therefore, our estimates
are likely to be lower bounds of the bargaining power eﬀect. Moreover, we exclude the
possibility of partner switches in our sample. All included women stay with the same
man.
In an extension, we test whether couples commit to household resource allocations.
For couples, who already have children, we deﬁne two relative income measures: their ex
ante relative income before they had children, Y R
0 , and the current relative income, Y R
t .
If there is commitment, the pre-children allocation should aﬀect the couples’ behavior,
i.e., they rely on the relative income obtained before they had the ﬁrst child and do
not ascertain a new bargaining power allocation afterwards. On the contrary, higher
12explanatory power of the current relative income in each period would indicate that
repeated renegotiations occur and that bargaining power is rather endogenous, because
the past decision to have a child alters individual incomes. This test is valid as long as
it is true that for the counterfactual case, i.e., a couple had not chosen to have children,
their bargaining power relation would not change over time.
In the section of robustness checks, we look for further evidence by considering child
beneﬁts in two respects. First, a varying eﬀect of child beneﬁts on fertility with pref-
erence heterogeneity can only occur if couples bargain over resource allocations. And
second, the eﬀect of child beneﬁts on fertility depends on bargaining power and prefer-
ence heterogeneity if couples bargain over fertility. Essentially, we apply two additional
tests of family bargaining. Moreover, if we ﬁnd that couples bargain over fertility, this
can have potentially large eﬀects for public policy, e.g., for specifying the recipient of
child beneﬁts. Considering child beneﬁts in the regressions can help us understand im-
mediately how their eﬀect on fertility depends on the underlying decision process in the
household. Thus, the interaction of treatment and the exogenous income from child ben-
eﬁts, ConflictBenefit, is introduced in a further speciﬁcation. In the unitary model,
changes in child beneﬁts would increase fertility independent of preference heterogene-
ity. Conversely, the bargaining model can predict diﬀerential eﬀects of these changes on
fertility for the conﬂict- and control-group. If there is a diﬀerent eﬀect for the conﬂict-
group, it indicates the presence of bargaining, although we will not detect if it is driven
by relative incomes.
Accordingly, in a ﬁnal speciﬁcation the interaction of all three variables Conflict 
Benefit  Y R is introduced to test whether eﬀects of beneﬁts are inﬂuenced by the
division of income and the treatment group dummy simultaneously. Intuitively, raising
child beneﬁts yields a greater eﬀect on fertility if the person with higher preferences has
greater bargaining power. Thus, we run a cross-section individual-level linear probability
regression with diﬀerent numbers of interaction terms of the equation
Birthi;t+1 =  + 1(Conflict  Y R)i;t[+2(Conflict  Benefit)i;t




where Xi;t are the remaining control variables of couple i in period t and  is an i.i.d.
13error term.
5 Empirical Results
In this section, we apply our speciﬁed equation to address the question of whether cou-
ples bargain over fertility or not. We report coeﬃcients from pooled linear probability
estimations with panel robust standard errors that are clustered at the individual level
and control for both serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. Coeﬃcients may, thus,
be interpreted as marginal eﬀects. In the baseline regression, the key coeﬃcient is the
interaction of the conﬂict dummy and relative income. On the left side of the regression
tables we report tests for the conﬂict group with higher female child preferences than
their partners and on the right estimations for women with lower preferences are shown.
Subsamples are composed of childless couples and parents.
5.1 Baseline results
We ﬁnd a strong positive relation between birth probability and relative income in the
columns in the left half of Table 3 for couples with conﬂicting child preferences if the
woman has higher child preferences than her partner. The interaction term, Conflict 
Y R, composed of the conﬂict dummy and relative income, indicates that relative income
has a diﬀerent eﬀect on birth probability for couples with conﬂicting preferences compared
to agreeing couples. In the ﬁrst column no controls are used, in the second column
the whole set of control variables is added. The coeﬃcient of the interaction term is
unaﬀected by adding control variables, while the main eﬀects are altered substantially. In
numbers the interaction eﬀect means, a woman with higher preferences than her partner,
who increases her relative income from zero to one, would increase the probability of
child birth by 4.5 percentage points more than a woman in a homogenous preference
couple, all else equal. Or, put diﬀerently, the negative eﬀect of higher female incomes in
homogenous preference couples is about compensated. A ten percentage points increase
in relative income in partnerships with conﬂicting preferences increases birth probability
by about half a percentage point compared to the control group. As the overall birth
probability is about 6 percent, we ﬁnd an economically signiﬁcant eﬀect that exceeds
the negative eﬀect on birth probability of higher female earnings, which appears in both
groups. This positive relation corresponds to what we summed up in Prediction 2 in
14the theoretical part. If the woman has higher child preferences than her partner, her
relative income generates a positive eﬀect on the probability of birth. Put diﬀerently, a
higher relative income implies that she has "more say" in fertility decisions. Although
this is not necessarily a causal eﬀect, as unobserved diﬀerences between homogeneous and
heterogeneous preference couples could drive the correlation, the results point towards
the occurrence of bargaining over fertility within couples.
Table 3: Baseline regression 1
Higher Child Preference Lower Child Preference
Variables All All All All
Conflict  Y
R 0.0453** 0.0448** -0.0024 -0.0166
(0.0182) (0.0179) (0.0204) (0.0205)
Y
R -0.0228** -0.0306*** -0.0228** -0.0270***
(0.0096) (0.0098) (0.0096) (0.0097)
Conflict -0.0134** -0.0150** -0.0101 -0.0129
(0.0067) (0.0066) (0.0091) (0.0091)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 11893 11893 9710 9710
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Reported coeﬃcients are from linear probability model with the dependent variable of birth in
the following period. Panel robust standard errors are computed. Control variables are age, catholic
denomination, native origin, household labor income, enrollment, ISCED1997 dummies, GDP growth,
a birth dummy and ﬁnancial worries.
In the right half of Table 3 the conﬂict is described by the female partner having
lower child preferences than her male counterpart. The coeﬃcient for the interaction,
Conflict  Y R, turns out negative as expected, though the eﬀect is not signiﬁcant and
smaller than for higher female preferences with and without controls. This nonlinearity in
the eﬀect of "more say" in the household decision implies that a woman can more easily
convince her partner of having more children with increasing bargaining power than
prevent family expansion if they wish to. An equivalent interpretation is that men with
higher preferences are unable to translate higher bargaining power in more children. This
could be due to the fact that women ultimately control the family’s fertility. Furthermore,
only women are able to cheat in the fertility decision without being noticed, i.e., using
contraceptives to avoid pregnancies if they want fewer children than their partners. The
estimates for women with lower preferences may thus be downward biased if decisions
15can involve deceit.
Table 4: Baseline regression 2
Higher Child Preference Lower Child Preference
Variables All Childless Parents All Childless Parents
Conflict  Y
R 0.0448** 0.1413** 0.0138 -0.0166 0.0580 -0.0282
(0.0179) (0.0618) (0.0165) (0.0205) (0.0664) (0.0184)
Y
R -0.0306*** -0.0887** -0.0399*** -0.0270*** -0.0895** -0.0403***
(0.0098) (0.0375) (0.0099) (0.0097) (0.0373) (0.0099)
Conflict -0.0150** -0.0540* -0.0110* -0.0129 -0.0694** -0.0078
(0.0066) (0.0316) (0.0064) (0.0091) (0.0334) (0.0091)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11893 1882 10011 9710 1680 8030
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Reported coeﬃcients are from linear probability model with the dependent variable of birth in
the following period. Panel robust standard errors are computed. Control variables are age, catholic
denomination, native origin, household labor income, enrollment, ISCED1997 dummies, GDP growth,
a birth dummy and ﬁnancial worries.
Interestingly, the eﬀect of bargaining power is not constant over diﬀerent family sta-
tuses as shown in Table 4. For childless women with higher child preferences the eﬀect
is very strong, while it becomes insigniﬁcant for parents. For the lower child prefer-
ence women the negative coeﬃcient in the parents-sample shows the smallest standard
error on the table’s right, although we do not see a comparably clear pattern. There
is a time proﬁle behind this heterogeneity that may tell an interesting story about the
endogeneity of bargaining power. The earnings relations of the family members may
change in response to family expansions. We consider this in more detail in the following
subsection.
Common to all samples are the estimates for main eﬀects. Components of interaction
terms, which separately enter the estimation, must be understood as the eﬀect when the
other interacted component is null. Relative income, Y R, itself has a negative eﬀect on
birth probability, given the interacted variables are zero, i.e., female relative income neg-
atively aﬀects birth probability in homogeneous preference couples. This is at odds with
our theoretical consideration, nevertheless there are two possible explanations. First,
relative income can, in some cases, be multicollinear with individual net earned income
so that it may partly capture the opportunity cost eﬀect of income foregone for child-
16bearing and childrearing. As our identiﬁcation relies on the diﬀerence between couples
with heterogeneous and homogeneous child preferences, the estimates are not compro-
mised by an eﬀect of relative income in the control group. Second, equality in reported
preferences from our roughly measured four categories does not rule out that preferences
may be approximately similar but still heterogeneous, but the overall negative coeﬃcients
disqualify this explanation. The coeﬃcient of the conﬂict group dummy for heteroge-
neous preference couples, Conflict, turns out negative, as conﬂicts over fertility arguably
decrease birth probabilities.
5.2 Results for a Simple Dynamic Bargaining
As our results of bargaining power on fertility are very diﬀerent between childless cou-
ples and parents, we consider an explanation of endogenous bargaining power for this
phenomenon. Suppose a couple with conﬂicting child preferences and equal individual
earned incomes decides to have a child. Later, the wife works part-time and earns less,
while her child preferences are still higher than her husband’s. Provided the partners
commit to the resource allocation they had before the ﬁrst child was born, they will
arrive at similar fertility choices as before, when deciding over having a second child.
If they do not commit to that allocation of resources, a new bargain over fertility is
carried out with lower bargaining power of the wife. This in turn means that a second
child becomes less likely. Committing to resource allocations is an implicit property of
collective models with Pareto optimal outcomes and makes sense if we think of mar-
riage as a complete contract. However, it is unclear whether couples are able and willing
to make such commitments. In a dynamic framework of household decisions (Ligon,
2002; Lundberg and Pollak, 2003; Basu, 2006; Iyigun and Walsh, 2007), renegotiations
are allowed. Bargaining power then becomes endogenous, i.e., it can be inﬂuenced by
household decisions.
In an extended speciﬁcation of our baseline regression, we capture the eﬀect of an
ex ante income. Concerning this matter, we introduce a new relative income variable,
Y R
0 , which is the relative income in the period before a couple had its ﬁrst child. We
understand this measure as the bargaining status a couple may commit to if it decides
to not let family developments interfere in their future decisions. It may also be seen as
the relative income that determines the lifetime fertility decision. This ex ante relative
income, Y R
0 , is interacted with the preference conﬂict dummy and estimated along with
17Table 5: Dynamic bargaining—couples with at least one child and ex ante bargaining
power





















Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Couples in the sample have at least one child. Relative income before children were born
imposes that only couples, who get the ﬁrst child within the sample period, are included. Reported
coeﬃcients are from linear probability model with the dependent variable of birth in the following
period. Panel robust standard errors are computed. Control variables are age, catholic denomination,
native origin, household labor income, enrollment, ISCED1997 dummies, GDP growth, a birth dummy
and ﬁnancial worries.
the previous income measure.
Table 5 reveals an interesting heterogeneity with respect to higher and lower female
preferences. The samples comprise only women, who have at least one child and were
already in the data before their ﬁrst child was born. For women with higher preferences,
we ﬁnd the interaction eﬀect with her commitment bargaining measure, the ex ante
relative income, to be positive and signiﬁcant. The interaction with their current income,
ConflictY R
t , is insigniﬁcant as in the baseline estimation. The ex ante relative income
still matters for the decision about a further child if the woman has higher preferences.
She can thus still argue with her supposedly higher bargaining power she had before
she became a mother, which means here that she will have an easier job to come to the
conclusion with her partner to get another child. If she has higher child preferences, the
couple commits to the ex ante resource allocation.
In the right half of Table 5 the female partner has lower child preferences in the case of
conﬂict. In contrast to the previous results the ex ante relative income has no signiﬁcant
18eﬀect, yet we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant and negative eﬀect of the current relative income. If
the woman has lower preferences, she cannot commit to the resource allocation she had
before the ﬁrst child was born. Though, the current bargaining power matters, i.e., the
higher her income share, the less likely is another child.
This heterogeneity in the underlying decision process provides an interesting insight.
If the female partner wants more children, she can commit to an early bargaining power
that is most probably superior to her later state, when she has children. She is able to
preserve say in the decision and get more children. On the contrary, if she wants less
children than her partner, but has already "lost" the decision in the ﬁrst instance and
became a mother, her presumably worsened bargaining position further decreases her say
in the decision about another child. If she loses income relative to her partner, another
child becomes more likely. We could suggest that this unfavorable process for her is
driven by male dominance in the partnership that is exacerbated when her bargaining
position worsens as a mother.
5.3 Robustness Checks
As a check for robustness of our previous estimates, we introduce additional interaction
terms that include child beneﬁts. These can also provide insight into the eﬀect of beneﬁt
payments on fertility within a bargaining framework. We report the results in Table 6 in
the same style as above, with higher female child preferences on the left side and lower
preferences compared to the partner on the right side of the table.
In the ﬁrst columns in each part of Table 6 we consider diﬀerential eﬀects of child bene-
ﬁts between the groups, which are captured by the interaction term of the conﬂict dummy
and child beneﬁts, Conflict  Benefit. For higher female preferences the eﬀect is sig-
niﬁcant and positive. Thus, child beneﬁts generate greater eﬀects for the heterogeneous
preference couples if the woman has higher child preferences. This could be driven by
group diﬀerences, if the conﬂict group had a diﬀerent average in child preferences. How-
ever, the results hold even after controlling for individual and the partners’ preferences,
though, tables are omitted here. The eﬀect of the variable of interest, ConflictY R, is
comparable to the baseline estimation. For women with lower child preferences than their
partner neither of the two eﬀects is signiﬁcant. In sum, women with higher preferences
in conﬂict couples are notably more responsive to child beneﬁts.
An interaction term of child beneﬁts and relative income, which is not exclusive to
19Table 6: Extended interaction terms
Higher Child Preference Lower Child Preference
Variables All All All All All All
Conflict  Y
R 0.0451** 0.0440** 0.1401** -0.0168 -0.0180 -0.0735
(0.0179) (0.0180) (0.0693) (0.0205) (0.0205) (0.0731)
Conflict 0.0426*** 0.0419*** 0.0626*** 0.0110 0.0046 -0.0098
Benefit (0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0202) (0.0174) (0.0172) (0.0252)
Benefit  Y
R 0.0428* 0.0705*** 0.0809*** 0.0720***





R -0.0299*** -0.0808*** -0.1137*** -0.0268*** -0.1230*** -0.1124***
(0.0098) (0.0298) (0.0327) (0.0097) (0.0294) (0.0325)
Conflict -0.0678*** -0.0664*** -0.0913*** -0.0264 -0.0183 -0.0010
(0.0207) (0.0206) (0.0257) (0.0245) (0.0244) (0.0339)
Benefit -0.0064 -0.0174 -0.0243** -0.0162* -0.0371*** -0.0349***
(0.0093) (0.0115) (0.0120) (0.0095) (0.0118) (0.0123)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11893 11893 11893 9710 9710 9710
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Reported coeﬃcients are from linear probability model with the dependent variable of birth in
the following period. Panel robust standard errors are computed. Control variables are age, catholic
denomination, native origin, household labor income, enrollment, ISCED1997 dummies, GDP growth,
a birth dummy and ﬁnancial worries.
the conﬂict or the homogeneous preferences group, controls for common eﬀects of child
beneﬁts on birth probability that vary with relative incomes. The variables of interest
remain largely unchanged.
In column four a triple interaction term of relative income, treatment and beneﬁts,
denoted by ConflictBenefitY R, is included. The triple interaction term should have
a positive eﬀect, as we expect an increasing eﬀect of child beneﬁts on birth probability
with relative income if child preferences are heterogeneous and bargaining over fertility
occurs. In other words, the marginal eﬀect indicates by how much fertility is raised
on average when increasing beneﬁts by one unit compared to women in homogeneous
preference couples or without any bargaining power. Each of the interacted components
should have a positive eﬀect on birth probability, given the other two components are
held constant. However, the eﬀect turns out insigniﬁcant, while the other variables of
interest are not altered much. The negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect of child beneﬁts seems
20odd, though it only denotes that for couples with homogeneous preferences and zero
income of the female partner child beneﬁts do not operate as expected. For women with
lower preferences than their partners the eﬀect is not signiﬁcant either. However, this is
not a test of directing transfers to a particular person. Child beneﬁts can be received by
the claimant whoever that is and we cannot observe which parent claims the beneﬁts.
Table 7: Regression without interpolated preference data
Higher Child Preference Lower Child Preference
Variables All Childless Parents All Childless Parents
Conflict  Y
R 0.0560* 0.0625 0.0450 0.0011 0.1450 -0.0419
(0.0309) (0.0870) (0.0281) (0.0402) (0.0962) (0.0383)
Y
R -0.0323** -0.0782* -0.0359** -0.0259* -0.0721 -0.0345**
(0.0142) (0.0455) (0.0150) (0.0142) (0.0455) (0.0150)
Conflict -0.0189 -0.0101 -0.0222** -0.0125 -0.0927** 0.0014
(0.0116) (0.0452) (0.0109) (0.0170) (0.0463) (0.0184)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4971 1054 3917 4355 929 3426
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Reported coeﬃcients are from linear probability model with the dependent variable of birth in
the following period. Panel robust standard errors are computed. Control variables are age, catholic
denomination, native origin, household labor income, enrollment, ISCED1997 dummies, GDP growth,
a birth dummy and ﬁnancial worries.
Our assumption regarding the preferences was that these are relatively stable over
time. Linear interpolation might otherwise indicate preference conﬂicts in all years be-
tween two survey periods, although the change in preferences occurred in a later period,
if preferences were homogeneous at ﬁrst. We therefore run the regression with just the
four surveyed periods for comparison with our baseline result. As is evident from Ta-
ble 7 the number of observations is more than halved. We can ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect for
bargaining power on birth probability even in this reduced sample, when women have
higher preferences than their partners and we use all observations. The subsample re-
sults become insigniﬁcant, as the results for women with lower preferences still are. The
estimates are imprecisely measured compared to our baseline results due to the smaller
sample and although the groups with interpolated preferences are blurred to some extent,
the magnitudes are reasonably close to our baseline results for women with higher pref-
erences. Positive eﬀects of bargaining power on birth probability for women with lower
21preferences contradict our prediction, however, the coeﬃcient in the middle of the right
hand side of Table 7 is based on only 24 births in the conﬂict group and is insigniﬁcant.
Table 8: Only women with non-zero income
Higher Child Preference Lower Child Preference
Variables All Childless Parents All Childless Parents
Conflict  Y
R 0.0558** 0.1778** 0.0088 0.0149 0.0805 0.0064
(0.0257) (0.0761) (0.0221) (0.0241) (0.0787) (0.0179)
Y
R -0.0082 -0.0926** -0.0104 -0.0028 -0.0875** -0.0156
(0.0135) (0.0434) (0.0137) (0.0133) (0.0425) (0.0136)
Conflict -0.0214* -0.0765* -0.0091 -0.0306*** -0.0800* -0.0275***
(0.0113) (0.0411) (0.0102) (0.0114) (0.0410) (0.0095)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7575 1716 5859 6287 1550 4737
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Reported coeﬃcients are from linear probability model with the dependent variable of birth in
the following period. Panel robust standard errors are computed. Control variables are age, catholic
denomination, native origin, household labor income, enrollment, ISCED1997 dummies, GDP growth,
a birth dummy and ﬁnancial worries.
Some of the women observed do not earn income themselves and thus have zero relative
income. This fact could lead to a bias if our results were only driven by comparing nonem-
ployed with employed women who contribute some income to the households’ resources.
Then the results would rather indicate a diﬀerential eﬀect of labor market involvement
instead of bargaining power. In Table 8 we therefore drop all women with zero income
and rerun the baseline estimation. The two positive and signiﬁcant estimates for women
with higher preferences than their partners in the overall and the non-parent sample
remain signiﬁcant and of similar magnitude. Thus, we can now be more certain about
measuring bargaining power as intended when using relative income in the estimations.
As the outcome variable birth in the following period is discontinuous, a linear index
model such as the probit or logit would be more eﬃcient but computationally cumbersome
with the several interaction terms included. In table 9 we show that the estimation
method does not change the basic result for higher preference women. With probit and
logit estimators the eﬀects of bargaining power on fertility are comparably large and
signiﬁcant as in our baseline model. The reported coeﬃcient for the interaction term
is the marginal eﬀect and standard errors are computed as proposed by Ai and Norton
22Table 9: Diﬀerent estimation approaches
Higher Child Preference
Variables Probit Logit FE
Conflict  Y
R 0.0453* 0.0475* 0.0558***
0.0175) 0.0181) (0.0189)
Y
R -0.3205*** -0.6801*** -0.0170*
(0.0935) (0.1895) (0.0102)
Conflict -0.1433** -0.2993** -0.0199***
(0.0584) (0.1216) (0.0069)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11892 11892 11893
Standard errors as displayed in stata in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Control variables are age, catholic denomination, native origin, household labor income, en-
rollment, ISCED1997 dummies, GDP growth, a birth dummy and ﬁnancial worries.
(2003). The other coeﬃcients are not interpretable. A last estimator in the third row
of table 9 uses the demeaning ﬁxed eﬀects estimation with OLS. By that we can control
for unobservable, time-constant characteristics that may be correlated with independent
variables, although we cannot compare those who do not get a child with those who do
get one in this setting. Unobservable ﬁxed eﬀects seem not to be a concern as the result
is very close to our baseline estimate.
6 Concluding Remarks
Our results suggest that a bargaining framework can better explain couples’ fertility
decisions than the unitary model. Relative income plays a key role for decision-making
as it determines bargaining power. Introducing child preferences in the estimation and
drawing on theoretical considerations about preference heterogeneity, we are able to
assess the one most important family decision—fertility—and lay out a framework for
testing bargaining over public goods. Our results show that couples bargain over fertility
and that the largest eﬀects of bargaining power appear at ﬁrst births if women have higher
preferences than their partners. Commitment to ex ante resource allocations is gender
speciﬁc—commitment appears if women have higher preferences than their partners and
renegotiations take place if their preferences are lower.
23Our results have direct implications for policy. Who receives the child beneﬁt can
aﬀect its impact on fertility. If beneﬁts are directed to the individual with higher child
preferences than her partner, then we should expect positive eﬀects on fertility. Descrip-
tive statistics suggest that on average women have higher child preferences. Furthermore,
couples seem not always to be able to commit to ex ante household resource allocations.
This in turn means that women, who bear a greater burden of raising children, are pe-
nalized by losing bargaining power in future decisions. Transfers directed to women and
policies to empower women in the labor market, e.g., with better child care supply, are
immediate recommendations to secure equal gender opportunities. Besides, except for a
possible endogenous increase of recipients, redirecting child beneﬁts is essentially cost-
less. Our recommendations are at odds with the well-known perception, as e.g., in Iyigun
and Walsh (2007), that empowering women lowers fertility. We have shown that in some
cases this result can be reversed.
In the presence of bargaining, the second policy goal of child beneﬁts, the improvement
of the well-being of children, may also be inﬂuenced. Though not tested explicitly, as
Lundberg et al. (1997) suggest, women may be more concerned about the quality of
children, i.e., the children’s well-being. Our results on fertility could then also be valid
for child quality. Women should thus receive the beneﬁts directly, as long as they live
with their children.
The consequences of bargaining mechanisms in the decision-making of couples are im-
portant to family policy and thus further research would be advisable in a number of
respects. First, better data could help to identify the group with higher child preferences
accurately. As of now, our belief is that women more often have higher preferences. Sec-
ond, commitment to household resource allocations is a key feature in marriage. Relying
on cooperative bargaining models hitherto seems reasonable, as marriage is all about
commitment. If commitment does not hold, as our results partly suggest, elaborate
models are needed. Third, household-level fertility models that incorporate preferences
are rare. These would help to ﬁnd more speciﬁc testable assumptions. And fourth, very
little is known about how preferences behave over time within marriage. Endogenous
preferences could alter the results substantially.
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